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Caspian stocks of energy resources are not, and most prob-
ably will not be, of any great significance on the world scale.
Nevertheless it is the Caspian region which will have 
the opportunity to become an oil exporter which will reduce
the dependence of the European countries on Arabian oil,
and which will guarantee Russia the quantities of gas which
are indispensable both for meeting its internal demands and
for maintaining its current level of export. For Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the confirmation of the exis-
tence of successive oil strata is not only an opportunity 
to increase income, but also an additional bargaining chip in
the game for the future of the whole region. The stake in this
game is the opportunity to limit the economic, and by exten-
sion the political influences of Russia in the region.
A significant event of last year was the announcement of the
initial results of tests from the Kashagan deposit in Kazakh-
stan. In a declaration made at end of July 2000, the interna-
tional Offshore Kazakhstan Operating Company consortium
(OKIOC), which had been conducting research in Kazakh-
stanÕs part of the Caspian Sea shelf, confirmed the discovery
of considerable amounts of oil. Although it was only stated
that the researchÕs initial results were promising, and that
measurement of the size of the deposit would only be possi-
ble after conducting further tests, the information given by
the OKIOC caused a sudden rise in interest in the region.
Together with the confirmation of the existence of large oil
deposits, the chances began to grow that plans for new
transport routes could be implemented, also including 
the Baku-Ceyhan project which had hitherto been viewed as
rather unrealistic, but which could compete with Russian
routes. The sudden growth of RussiaÕs fear of losing its
monopoly position in the transport field, and the rise in
demand for energy resources in Russia itself, led during the
last year to MoscowÕs determination to maintain control over
the transit of Caspian raw materials. However, despite
a range of actions taken by Moscow, the question of the
regionÕs future has not yet been finally decided.
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What is the game about?: 
How big are the Caspian
deposits really?
The amount of the currently confirmed supplies of crude oil in the
Caspian region exceed by a factor of two the amount of supplies
in the North Sea. However for the worldÕs energy balance, these
amounts do not have any great significance; Caspian oil makes
up barely 3.4% of world resources. At the same time, predictions
regarding the size of Caspian strata resources exceed by several
times the amount of supplies currently confirmed. If these pre-
dictions proved to be true, the Caspian region could begin to com-
pete with Saudi Arabia, although talk of a Ôsecond Persian Gulf Õ
would still be strongly exaggerated. (see Table 1: Supplies of
crude oil in Caspian region, p. 51).
From among the countries of the region, both the biggest con-
firmed and predicted supplies of crude oil lie in Kazakhstan,
which is and will be the main regional exporter of this raw mate-
rial (see Table 2: Production of crude oil in Caspian region,
p. 51). Second place regarding both supplies and production 
is currently occupied by Azerbaijan. Yet predictions regarding the
potential supplies of this raw material suggest that Tu r k m e n i s t a nÕ s
r e s e r v e s may considerably exceed the amount in the Azerbaijan
strata. Nevertheless, it is Azerbaijan which will have the greater
opportunities for expanding its exports in the near future.
The confirmed supplies of natural gas in Caspian region are, to be
sure, more than five times less than near-East or Russian
reserves, although on a world scale they have potentially greater
significance than Caspian oil; they make up 6.3% of world sup-
plies of this raw material. The most optimistic predictions regard-
ing size of Caspian gas supplies state that they may even be
twice as large as has been hitherto confirmed. (see Table 3:
Supplies of natural gas in Caspian region, p. 51). Both the biggest
confirmed and predicted strata are to be found in Turkmenistan.
Although currently the biggest regional producer of gas is Uzbe-
kistan, because of its considerable internal consumption it has
little significance as an exporter (see Table 4: Production of na-
tural gas in Caspian region, p. 51). The main exporter of gas 
is and will remain Turkmenistan, whose level of export exceeds
the size of UzbekistanÕs exports by more than tenfold.
Who needs Caspian energy
r e s o u r c e s ?
Caspian oil may have relevant significance for Western Europe
and Turkey: increasing their import possibilities would allow these
countries to limit their dependence on deliveries of near-East oil,
and would also guarantee Turkey a significant influence on the
transit of the raw material. Nevertheless the inland location of the
main Caspian producers of energy resources, together with their
considerable distance from their potential markets, and a lack of
appropriate transport infrastructure, limits their export possibili-
ties. The necessity to prepare the transport of raw material by
pipelines (a method notably more expensive than, for example,
transport by tankers) requires a great deal of investment.
Meanwhile, the lack of a final answer to the fundamental region-
al question of Ôhow much supply of raw material is there in the
Caspian region?Õ has for years slowed the activities of potential
investors. The current level of production is too low to guarantee
that any potential investments would pay off. At the same time,
the predictions are so promising that international consortia are
inclined to wait until they are officially confirmed.
The answer to the question of the amount of raw materials in the
region requires precise research to be conducted, for which time
and means are required. The manner in which the research has
been conducted seems to confirm the thesis of deliberate delay
in announcing final results by international consortia, in anticipa-
tion of a predicted growth in world (and especially European)
demand for energy resources in the near future. Foreign investors
are not currently interested in quick extraction and sale of raw
materials; their goal is to guarantee access to these strata for
themselves in the future, and to begin introductory investments,
which will be small in comparison to those ultimately required.
Although in Kazakhstan more than 40 international consortia
have been founded which are concerned with searching for and
extracting oil and building new pipelines, together with around 20
more such consortia in Azerbaijan, only a few of them have
become involved in these enterprises on a large scale. These are
TengizChevroil, the Caspian Pipeline Consortium and the OKIOC in
Kazakhstan, and the AIOC in Azerbaijan 1.
The ever-extending anticipation of a final decision is definitely in
RussiaÕs favour, as by timely profiting it may carry out projects to
make its own transport network more efficient, and thus increase
their own competitiveness. For Russia, the import of Caspian gas
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has strategic importance. The deepening crisis in the Russian gas
sector (based on a growth in raw material deficit on the internal
market and the simultaneous necessity to maintain exports)
makes Russia obliged to look for additional sources of import. In
this situation, the possibility of exploiting the resources of the
Caspian seems to be an ideal solution: it allows internal demand
to be met at relatively low expense, and the planned level of
exports to be maintained. No less relevant than the import of raw
materials itself is the fact that Russia maintains a transport
monopoly of these raw materials, and what follows on from that,
maintains its significant political influence in the region.
For the United States, the question of Caspian resources is pri-
marily a problem of a political nature. In accordance with the
thinking of the American administration up to now, the USAÕs
main goal in the Caspian region has been to create astable polit -
ical and economic safety zone in the southern areas of the former
USSR, which will be linked to the West and not dependent either
on Russia or Iran. This is also the reason for the support which
Washington gives to projects for creating a transport network to
allow the export of Caspian raw materials while bypassing
Russia. The breaking of the Russian transport monopoly may fun-
damentally increase the chances of the Caspian states to attain
economic independence. However the American idea has one
fundamental flaw Ð it is based on political and not economic
arguments, which means that in the current situation it is not the
way to convince Western investors. From an economic point of
view, the implementation of plans supported by Russia seems
considerably more advantageous, which also explains the sup-
port they enjoy among international businesses. The involvement
of Western firms in the realisation of these projects testifies to
a significant discord between the political interests of Western
countries and the interests of Western companies.
When considering the significance of the CaspianÕs energy
resources, one should also note the importance of oil and gas
sectors for the regionsÕ economies. In Turkmenistan the level of
gas export is a factor which determines the size of GNP to a sig-
nificant degree. In Kazakhstan, the export of energy resources
makes up more than 40% of total exports, a figure which in
Azerbaijan amounts to more than 75% (data from Kazakstan
Economic Trends IV-VI 2000; Azerbaijan Economic Trends VI-XII
1999). Further increases in extraction and export guarantees
additional budget income which is essential for the functioning of
these countriesÕ economies, and also increases their chances for
economic independence. However, any sudden development in
extraction industry would be accompanied by the danger that the
Caspian countries would become totally dependent on this very
branch of industry.
Activities concerning the ex p o r t
of Caspian raw materials 
onto world markets
Currently almost all exports of Caspian energy resources onto
external markets are controlled by Moscow (see Addendum:
ÔMain export routesÕ, p. 49 and Map, p. 52). More than 70% of
the oil exported by pipelines from the Caspian region flows
through two Russian pipelines (from Kazakhstan port of Atyrau on
the northern coast of the Caspian Sea to the Samara refinery on
the Volga, and from the Azerbaijan capital Baku to Novorossiysk,
the Ru s s i a n crude oil terminal on the Black Sea). More than 80%
of the regionÕs gas passes through the Central Asia Ð Russia Ð
Europe gas pipeline. It is afundamental goal of Russian policy not
to allow any change in this situation, nor any breaking of RussiaÕs
transit monopoly. The decisions taken by the Kremlin aimed at
deepening the dependence of Caspian countries regarding trans-
port seem very efficient; last summer the Russian authorities
took the decision to increase the transport quotas of Kazakhstan
oil by the AtyrauÐ Samara pipeline. Though the motivations of this
decision were clear to all (the then Minister of Fuel and Energy
Viktor Kaluzhny stated openly that this was a way of reducing
KazakhstanÕs interest in realising the Baku Ð Ceyhan project), it
could not fail to please Kazakhstan, which was wrestling with
problem of how to export its oil. The building of a new pipeline
from Tengiz (the largest crude oil stratum being exploited in
Kazakhstan) to Novorossiysk, the completion of which is planned
for June this year, also appears to be a very advantageous alter-
native for Kazakhstan, which does not of itself possess any other
transport options. Impressive is also the skill of Russian diplo-
macy in the fields which are to ensure Moscow full control over
future channels of export of Caspian raw materials. Russian
reaction to the confirmation of the discovery of significant
amounts of oil in KazakhstanÕs Kashagan stratum was immedi-
ate; some days after the announcement by the OKIOC of the ini-
tial results of the research, representatives of the Russian
Foreign Ministry came forward with a proposal to se the Tengiz Ð
Novorossiysk pipeline to export the newly-discovered oil, and
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declarations of RussiaÕs readiness to increase the capacity of the
old AtyrauÐ Samara pipeline were made.
At the same time Russia is a tough negotiator, and from its strong
bargaining position can even allow itself to suspend imports of
raw materials from any country which does not want to accept its
conditions. The Russians applied this tactic in 1997Ð8 (among
other occasions) because of misunderstandings concerning the
transit charges, price and route of sending gas from Turkme-
nistan. The dramatic fall of gas exports which followed as aresult
of GazpromÕs blockade on the export of TurkmenistanÕs gas
emphatically brought home to Ashkhabad the degree of its
dependence on the Russian transport network.
The results of the efforts which have been undertaken for years
to break the Russian transport monopoly, which are supported by
the United States and aim at diversifying the exports of the
Caspian states, cannot really be called impressive. So far they
have only led to the reconstruction of the BakuÐSupsa pipeline
(the so-called western route, from the capital of Azerbaijan to the
Georgian oil terminal on the Black Sea, which was opened in April
1999). In 1997, thanks to the Iranian-Turkmenistan accord, agas
line connecting gas fields in Turkmenistan with northern Iran was
also opened. However the capacity of the western route Ð nearly
twice lower than the Russian pipeline (AtyrauÐSamara), as well
as more than four times lower than the capacity of the Russian
gas line (Central Asia ÐRussia) Ð means that there is no hope of
any of the above-mentioned cases breaking the Russian monop-
oly in the field of transport.
The implementation of the plan supported by the American
administration for a main pipeline from Baku to Ceyhan (the Tur-
kish oil terminal on the Mediterranean), which was in principle to
free the Caspian states from dependence on the Russian trans-
port network, does not in the longer term seem very likely. This
project is the most expensive of all those hitherto proposed, and
its construction, in the opinion of specialists, would only be eco-
nomically justified if the export of oil by this route could be guar-
anteed at the level of 50 million tonnes per year. Meanwhile,
AzerbaijanÕs planned production for the year 2000 will not reach
much beyond 14 million tonnes, and although over the next eight
years an almost doubling in growth of Azerbaijan oil production is
predicted, this does not mean that it will all be transported to
Ceyhan. The reinforcement of the pipeline by KazakhstanÕs oil
would require not only final confirmation of the existence of new
strata of this raw material, and the decision by Kazakhstan to
send oil by this very pipeline, but also the construction of an addi-
tional link via the Caspian Sea to Baku.
Turkey remains a fervent adherent of the BakuÐCeyhan project.
This is demonstrated among other things by the obligations
undertaken by Ankara to finance the construction of a sector of
pipeline running through Turkish territory (at an estimated cost of
US$1.4 billion). However, neither pressure from the American
administration, nor AnkaraÕs obligations, nor gestures by the par-
liaments of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey which midway through
last year unanimously ratified a package of documents concern-
ing the building of BakuÐCeyhan pipeline, will foreclose the pro-
jectÕs realisation. As it seems, the result of the technical and eco-
nomic planning which a group of Western companies is to con-
duct in the next few months will be decisive, as will be any pos-
sible support by Kazakhstan.
The second great transport project supported by the American
administration, the plan to build a trans-Caspian gas pipeline
( Tu r k m e n i s t a nÐA z e r b a i j a nÐTu r key), has also come to a dead halt.
To be sure, a feasibility study has been carried out, and in 1999
the PSG international consortium was created, which was to con-
cern itself with building the gas pipeline; however since that time
the work has not in principle made any progress. Carrying out this
project without unqualified support from Turkmenistan and adec-
laration by Ashkhabad of readiness to export gas by this particu-
lar route is ultimately pointless. Meanwhile, last spring Azer-
baijan, in connection with the discovery of significant reserves of
gas, began to demand half of the transferral quota of the gas
pipeline, which evoked definite discontent from Turkmenistan,
and appears to have resulted in another rapprochement between
Turkmenistan and Russia. In May during Vladimir PutinÕs visit to
Ashkhabad, the presidents of both countries concluded an initial
agreement regarding the increase over the next few years of
deliveries of Turkmenistan gas to Russia amounting to 10 billion
cubic metres a year, rising to 50 billion cubic metres in total. 
The conclusion of this agreement, which was to apply over a peri-
od of 20 to 30 years, would mean the de facto abandonment of
the trans-Caspian project. The predicted growth in export to
Russia at a level of more than 30 billion cubic metres, in con-
nection with the planned export of 30 billion cubic metres of gas
to Ukraine, and with an internal consumption of more than 11 bil-
lion cubic metres and a potential export possibility of around 
9 billion cubic metres to Iran, considerably exceeds Tu r k m e-
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n i s t a nÕs current level of production (currently standing at around
46.4 billion cubic metres per year), and prevents Ashkhabad from
becoming involving in building the trans-Caspian gas pipeline.
Despite the fact that recently (because of the misunderstandings
concerning the price of gas) there has not yet been any signing of
a long-erm agreement with Russia, the project to build the trans-
Caspian pipeline is in a state of suspension.
For the most part, the remaining projects for alternatives to
Russian routes have even less chance of coming to fruition, either
for economic (the Kazakhstan Ð China oil pipeline, the Turkme-
nistanÐChina gas pipeline) or political reasons (the Kazakhstan
ÐTurkmenistanÐAfghanistanÐPakistan oil pipeline, the Turkme-
nist a nÐI r a nÐTu r key or Tu r k m e n i s t a nÐA f g h a n i s t a nÐPakistan gas
p i p e l i n e s ) .
S u m m a ry Ð effects of actions
concerning the energy resources
of the Caspian region
The most obvious effect of the game concerning Caspian raw
materials is the deepening dependence of the main regional oil
and gas producers on Russia. Years of diplomatic endeavours by
American diplomacy, and attempts to gain independence from
Russia taken by the governments of the newly constituted states,
have not only failed to deprive Russia of its position as the region-
al transit monopolist, but have also failed to hinder it in strength-
ening that position. At the same time, two relevant questions
forming Russian policy towards the region must be borne in mind.
On one hand, because of its lack of finances, Moscow is not able
independently to realise its interests in the region, and must win
the support of Western investors for its projects (such as the
ÔRussianÕ TengizÐNovorossiysk pipeline); Russian companies are
financing hardly 30% of its construction). On the other hand,
meanwhile, the Kremlin still possesses instruments of politics
and of force, that put it in a position to oppose any projects which
pose a real threat to Russian strategic interests in the region. This
consists of both pressure on the leaders of individual states (who
are mostly members of former Soviet nomenklatura), and the
possibility of destabilising the situation in the region, for example
by stoking the fires in one of the frozen conflicts in the Trans-
Caucasus (for example Nagorno-Karabakh). Thus both Russia
and foreign investors have the means by which they can render
impossible any realisation of the other sideÕs plans. At the same
time, both sides depend on the advantages from the export of
Caspian raw materials, and regarding purely economic argu-
ments, are inclined to make ongoing concessions.
Attempts at forecast
1 . Nothing indicates that the near future will bring any opportunity
to deprive Russia of its position of transport monopolist in the
Caspian region, and by extension to limit its influence in the region.
2. The opening of Tengiz ÐNovorossiysk pipeline this year will be
another stage in the strengthening of RussiaÕs position in the
region.
3. The chances for carrying out the BakuÐCeyhan project, which
could potentially limit the Caspian statesÕ transport dependence
on Russia, are not great. As it seems, the only way currently of
interesting foreign investors in this plan would be final confirma-
tion of the existence of large amounts of oil in KazakhstanÕs
Kashagan stratum, and also a decision to export it by this very
pipeline.
4. Significantly more likely seems RussiaÕs assumption of control
over the export of oil from the Kashagan stratum (through the link
with the AtyrauÐ Samara pipeline, or by exploitation of the new
TengizÐNovorossiysk link). KazakhstanÕs decision to entrust the
export of oil from Kashagan to Russian mediators would most
probably mean the final ruling-out of the BakuÐCeyhan project.
5. The predicted growth of the oil and gas deficit in the Russian
internal market, and RussiaÕs need to maintain export, means
that taking control of gas and oil export from the Caspian region
has afundamental importance for Russia. This concerns both the
internal needs of the Russian Federation and its plans for expan-
sion, above all into the European and Turkish gas markets.
6. A lack of appropriate financial means prevents the realisation
of Russian interests in the Caspian region without support from
foreign investors. In turn, collaboration with Russia gives Western
companies who get involved in the region a certain kind of guar-
antee of the safety of their investments. It thus appears that lack-
ing other perspectives for foreign investors to function in the
region, this bilaterally advantageous arrangement will become
stronger.
7. Surprising turns in the gas negotiations conducted by Turkme-
nistan mean that any predictions of its next moves are entirely
unrealistic. In the long-term perspective, further dependence 
of Ashkhabad on the Russian transport system can nevertheless
be expected.
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8. The political interests of Western states in the Caspian region
are often at odds with the interests of Western companies.
Foreign investorsÕ involvement in the region cannot thus be inter-
preted as confirmation of any strengthening of these countriesÕ
position over the Caspian Sea.
Anna Wo¸owska
A n n exe s
1. Main oil export routes (data regarding 
capacity of individual routes from US
EIA Caspian Sea Report, July 2000)
a) active
A t y r a uÐS a m a r a, constructed 30 years ago; connected in Samara
to the Druzba system; current capacity 10.3 million tonnes per
year (0.21 million barrels a day), plans to increase capacity to
15.4 million tonnes per year (0.31 million barrels aday).
Baku ÐNovorossiysk (northern route) opened towards end of
1997; acknowledged by Russia as the optimal solution from 
an economic viewpoint; length 1347 km.
Nevertheless it has several disadvantages:
Ð it runs through the territory of Chechnya, and since September
1999 a rail diversion has operated around the Chechen segment
via Dagestan, although its capacity from a technical viewpoint is
minimal (3.4 million tonnes annually);
Ð its capacity is 14.8 million tonnes annually (0.3 million barrels
a day), which upon the predicted increase in extraction may soon
prove to be insufficient; furthermore, the transhipment port at
Novorossiysk is not ready for any increase in amount of delivery;
Ð in this pipeline, high-quality Azerbaijan oil is mixed with signif-
icantly worse quality oil from the Volga and western Siberia.
Ð another problem is also how to transport the oil reaching
Novorossiysk further via TurkeyÕs territory, to the Bosphorus and
Dardanelles straits; Turkey is increasing its safety demands
regarding the tankers which use the straits, and can also at any
moment suspend traffic through the straits, because further
expansion may exceed their capacity;
Ð apurely political factor; this route gives Russia full control over
the export of Azerbaijan oil.
B a k uÐS u p s a (western route) Ð operating since April 1999, length
917 km, capacity 5.5 million tonnes a year (0.115 million barrels
a day), to 2002 it is to be expanded to 10.3 million tonnes a year
(0.21 million barrels aday).
Ð The basic disadvantage of this route is the limited market of oil
sale in the countries of the Black Sea region.
b) under construction
TengizÐNovorossiysk Ð most advanced investment in the area 
of new export routes for Caspian oil, which is to be opened in June
this year. Capacity of 28 million tonnes a year (0.56 million 
barrels a day), to reach a target of 66 million tonnes a year 
(1.34 million barrels a day).
c) in planning stage
BakuÐCeyhan (main pipeline) Ð supported by American admin-
istration for political reasons; its creation would allow the export
of Caspian oil bypassing both Russia and Iran. Its construction
will only be economically justified when around 50 million tonnes
a year will be exported by this route. Length of route 1994 km;
capacity one million barrels a day.
Advantages of this route:
Ð it solves the Bosphorus problem
Ð in contrast to the already existing pipelines (Baku ÐNovo-
rossiysk, Baku-Supsa) and the currently constructed part of
TengizÐNovorossiysk, it does not lead to the market of the Black
Sea countries.
Ð it is destined to export large amounts of oil; its capacity cannot
be compared with existing pipelines (Baku Ð Novorossiysk 14,8
million tonnes a year; AtyrauÐSamara 10,3 million tonnes a y e a r ) ;
planned capacity of 50 million tonnes a year.
Ð the port of Ceyhan is able to serve units of large carrying
capacity, which makes further transport of raw material easier.
Ð it economically frees Azerbaijan from dependence on Russia.
Disadvantages:
Ð high building costs: it is the longest route of all, and by exten-
sion the most expensive (predicted construction costs are
between US$2.4 and 3.7 billion).
II. Main export routes of gas 
(data regarding capacity of individual
routes for US EIA Caspian Sea Report,
July 2000)
a) active
Central Asia Ð R u s s i a Ð E u r o p e ( Tu r k m e n i s t a n Ð Ka z a k h s t a n Ð
Ru s s i a , branching off to Uzbekistan); uses old Soviet system of
pipelines; capacity 110 billion cubic metres (according to other
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sources, 110 million cubic metres is the capacity according to the
original plan; meanwhile in its current technical state, its true
capacity does not exceed 40 billion cubic metres).
Turkmenistan Ð Iran (from the Korpece gas fields in eastern
Turkmenistan to Korkuy in north-eastern Iran); new, opened 
in 1997; length 200 km; capacity 8 to 9.9 billion cubic metres, 
by 2005 is to be expanded to 22 billion cubic metres, by 2010 
to 31.1 billion cubic metres.
b) planned
Trans-Caspian pipeline: Turkmenistan Ð Azerbaijan (Baku) Ð
Turkey (Erzurum); capacity 31 billion cubic metres; length
around 1700 km; initial tests have been conducted, the project is
to be directed by PSG and Shell.
Centgas (Central Asia Gas); TurkmenistanÐPakistan (with possi-
ble extension to India); capacity 19 billion cubic metres, length
1440 km, and a further 640 km from Pakistan to India.
Declaration of intention signed by Turkmenistan, Pa k i s t a n ,
Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.
Chinese variation; TurkmenistanÐKazakhstanÐChina, possibly
Japan; capacity 28 billion cubic metres; length over 8000 kilo-
metres, and longer if to Japan; Exxon, Mitsubishi & CNPC have
conducted initial tests and suspended activities.
TurkmenistanÐIran (SeraksÐTehran); capacity 19 billion cubic
metres, planned increase to 51-59 billion cubic metres.
TurkmenistanÐIranÐTurkey (EkaremÐTuranÐTabriz); capacity
28 billion cubic metres; length 2160 km; Royal Dutch/Shell have
conducted detailed tests, for the time being there are no further
activities.
1 KazakhstanÕs main producer of oil is the TengizChevroil company, founded 
in 1993, 75% of whose shares are owned by American companies, 
20% by Kazakhstan and 5% by Russia. The company extracts raw oil from 
the largest stratum exploited in Kazakhstan, the Tengiz. The construction 
of the pipeline from Tengiz to Novorossiysk is being undertaken by the Caspian
Pipeline Consortium, whose largest shareholders are Russian and American
companies. The penetration of the Kashagan stratum is being undertaken 
by OKIOC, the Offshore Kazakhstan International Operating Company,
in which Western firms have the large majority of shares; the largest oil 
producer in Azerbaijan is AIOC, the Azerbaijan International Operating
Company, founded in 1994.
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* regions bordering the Caspian Sea only
Azerbaijan
Iran*
Kazakhstan
Russia*
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Total
Confirmed supplies
1.71
0.01
2.41
0.37
0.23
0.04
4.78
Predicted supplies
4.4
2.1
12.6
1.9
11.0
0.3
32.2
Total
6.1
2.1
15.0
2.3
11.2
0.3
37.0
Table 1. Supplies of crude oil in Caspian region, according to US EIA Caspian Sea Report, July 2000 (billions of tons)
* regions bordering the Caspian Sea only
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Iran*
Russia*
Total
1990
12.9
30.1
6.2
4.3
0.0
7.2
60.8
2000 (predictions)
14.5
33.0
7.5
8.5
0.0
0.5
64.0
2010 (predictions)
60.0
100.0
10.0
10.0
0.0
15.0
195.0
Table 2. Production of crude oil in Caspian region, according to US EIA Caspian Sea Report, July 2000 (Production in millions of tons)
* regions bordering the Caspian Sea only
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Iran*
Russia*
Total
1990
9.8
7.1
87.3
40.5
0.0
6.2
151.0
2000 (predictions)
6.2
10.7
46.2
56.3
0.0
0.8
120.3
2010 (predictions)
31.0
31.0
109.9
67.6
0.0
no data
239.4
Table 4. Production of earth gas in Caspian region, according to US EIA Caspian Sea Report, July 2000, Production in millions of cubic metres
* regions bordering the Caspian Sea only
Azerbaijan
Iran*
Kazakhstan
Russia*
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
Total
Confirmed supplies
0.3
0.0
2.3
no data
4.3
2.4
9.3
Predicted supplies
0.9
0.3
2.4
no data
4.5
0.9
9.0
Total
1.2
0.3
4.7
no data
8.8
3.3
18.3
Table 3. Supplies of earth gas in Caspian region, according to US EIA Caspian Sea Report, July 2000 (billions of cubic metres)

